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STATEMENT OFLIEUTENANT GENERAL FRANK
LIBUTTICOMMANDING GENERAL, III
MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCEBEFORE
THESENATE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEESUBCOMMITTEE ON
READINESSON21 APRIL 1999CONCERNING
READINESS
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1Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before this Committee. Having
beenprivileged to command the III
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) for
the past twoyears, I can assure you
that readiness of the force lies at
the heart of everything wedo in the
Western Pacific. Therefore, I am
pleased to give you my personal
viewsof our capability to carry out
assigned missions and tasks.The III
MEF is comprised of the 3rd Marine
Division, 1st Marine AircraftWing,
3rd Force Service Support Group, and
31st Marine Expeditionary Unit(MEU).
While Okinawa, Japan, serves as our
main operating base, by no
meansshould you assume that our
forces are there to garrison
Okinawa. We also haveforces
stationed on mainland Japan, Korea,
and Hawaii. Moreover, on average,
20percent of the force is deployed
to other locations in the Pacific
for training andoperations. In
addition to my III MEF
responsibilities, I serve as
Commander,Marine Corps Bases, Japan;
Commander, Marine Forces Japan; and
Commander,Landing Force, 7th Fleet (CTF
79). As such, I am responsible for
24,000 Marinesand Sailors.Implicit
in our forward deployed status are
two major responsibilities. Thefirst
is to furnish the National Command
Authorities and the Commander in
Chief,Pacific Command with quick
response forces for crisis
situations across thespectrum of
conflict. A strong and viable Marine
Air Ground Task Force
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2(MAGTF), III MEF is fully capable
of serving as either the nucleus of
a Joint TaskForce (JTF) command
element or the Marine component of a
JTF throughout thePacific Rim
region. Additionally, III MEF is
fully capable of responding on
shortnotice with two highly flexible
standing contingency packages. The
first, the AlertContingency MAGTF,
is a robust air-ground team that is
prepared to commencedeployment
within 24 hours of notification by a
unified Commander in Chief.
Thesecond, the 31stMEU, is the only
permanently forward-deployed MEU.
Togetherwith Amphibious Readiness
Group-11 from 7thFleet, 31st MEU has
repeatedlydemonstrated its ability
to quickly respond to contingencies.
Most recently, inNovember 1998, 31st
MEU responded in less than 96 hours,
fully manned, fullymaintained, and
combat ready, for deployment to the
Persian Gulf for OperationDesert
Fox.The second major responsibility
pertains to Cooperative Engagement,
insupport of the National Military
Strategy for coalition warfare. This
is key tobuilding and maintaining
alliances and to promoting regional
stability. Weaccomplish this through
an aggressive program of 70
off-island exercises annually,most
of which are Battalion sized or
larger, numerous humanitarian
assistanceoperations, senior officer
visits, and military-to-military
contacts designed todevelop mutual
trust and understanding.
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3These responsibilities require that
we remain both ready and capable
ofrapidly and decisively executing
the full range of military
operations. Fromdeployment (by
strategic air and sea lift) to
employment (as a fully manned
andsuperior trained fighting force)
to sustainment (with modern working
equipment,maintained with adequate
supplies and parts), your MEF stands
ready to ensure thesuccess the
American people expect and demand.In
my view, readiness is, quite simply,
the continuous capability to
provideand sustain personnel and
units to execute assigned missions.
When measuringreadiness, troop
strength, adequacy of training,
condition of equipment andsystems,
and other largely quantitative data
are considered. But, in the end, it
is thecommander who must judge
whether those indicators are
sufficient and accurate.The
commander's assessments must be
followed by critical analyses to
determinewhere resources (Marines,
materiel, money) can most
effectively be applied. Whenpossible,
we realign resources internally to
relieve stresses and strains, but
one can“rob Peter to pay Paul” only
so long; eventually, additional
assets will be required toeliminate
deficiencies. By any measure, our
readiness today is adequate,
asevidenced by the 31st MEU’s recent
successful deployment and our
continuedinvolvement in a robust
exercise schedule. On average, 93
percent of our groundcombat systems
were up and operationally ready
throughout 1998, and we
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4maintained our tactical aircraft at
an average mission capable rate of
77 percentduring the same
year.However, there are unique
features that make readiness within
III MEFparticularly challenging. The
constantly changing political and
economicenvironment within the
Pacific AOR and especially the
challenges we face with theOkinawa
Prefectural Government require us to
be ambassadors 24 hours a
day.Additionally, the immense size
of the area in which we train and
operate isapproximately eight times
the size of CONUS, as reflected in
Figure 1.Note: All Distances are
from OkinawaLet me give you my
personal view of what I believe are
our strengths andweaknesses.The one
area that keeps me awake at night is
the shortfall of strategic lift,
both seaand air, because it directly
impacts my war fighting readiness.
The lack of adequatetraining areas
and ranges on Okinawa requires us to
deploy and conduct nearly all
ofStraits1900nmTokyo785nmDarwin2400nmJakarta2200nmStraitsof
Malacca1900nmManila785nmTokyo785nmHawaii4000nmVladivostok
1150nmSeoul705nmBangkok1700nmOkinawaPacific
AORFigure 1
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5our live fire and combined arms
training off island. And, we no
longer have accessto the vast,
multi-purpose ranges once used
extensively in the Philippines. We
are,however, eagerly awaiting the
signing of the Visiting Forces
Agreement, so we canreturn to the
Philippines to train. Instead, we
must rely on exercises in
suchcountries as Australia,
Thailand, and Korea to “train as we
fight.” Getting to off-island
training locations is not only
difficult, but expensive. The U.S.
Navy andUSTRANSCOM do their best to
accommodate us, but the lack of sea
and air lift isa reality which we
view with deep concern. In the words
of former Commandant,General Barrow,
"I have more fight than I can
ferry." Eighty percent of our
off-island training requires air
lift, but the C-141 fleet is being
retired (and not replacedon a
one-for-one basis by the C-17). The
continuing drawdown of C-141s may
welleliminate our Western
Pacific-based strategic air lift and
require us to spendsignificantly
more to maintain our training
commitments by paying to fly
theseaircraft from CONUS.
Consequently, we rely heavily on
opportune lift by the AirForce to
meet deployment support
requirements. Additionally, higher
air lift costsreduce the amount of
funding available for maintenance
and equipment, whilelengthier
periods of time at off-island
training sites (awaiting return
transportation)not only consumes
funds, but also increases deployment
tempo. To cope with theshortfall in
strategic lift, we sometimes
schedule exercises around strategic
liftavailability or leave equipment
in place for follow-on exercises in
the same location.
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6Although leaving equipment in place
can result in rapid degradation and
additionalequipment maintenance
expense, it ensures the equipment is
available and savescost of strategic
lift. For example, in FY98 we
supported two back-to-back
KoreanIncremental Training Program
exercises with the same equipment
that was used forUlchi Focus Lens;
we simply left the gear and support
personnel in Korea forapproximately
six months to support the follow-on
exercises.The limited availability
of amphibious sea lift also
negatively impacts my warfighting
readiness. Only four amphibious
ships are forward deployed in the
WesternPacific, three of which
primarily support our standing
maritime contingency force,the 31st
MEU. The lack of amphibious sea lift
limits opportunities for the
MEFCommand Element and other Major
Subordinate Commands to train
foramphibious-based missions, a
troubling deficiency considering
that III MEF isdesignated an
amphibious assault force in two
major war plans.Secondly, we have
reached a critical point in the life
cycle of our ground andaviation
equipment; we are facing virtual
block obsolescence of crucial end
items.As our equipment ages it
becomes more expensive to maintain
in terms of parts andman-hours. Our
Marines are spending time
maintaining aged equipment
whichdraws valuable time and
resources away from training.
Deployments in support ofreal-world
contingencies further complicate the
challenge of equipment readiness.As
I mentioned earlier, the 31st MEU
deployed last November to the U.S.
Central
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7Command's area of responsibility
with only a 96 hour notice. When the
initial strikeagainst Iraq was
launched in support of Operation
Desert Fox, the 31st MEU wasdeployed
on the ground in Kuwait, relying on
30-year-old CH-46Es as the
primetroop transport helicopter. The
MEU’s 17-year-old M198 howitzers
providedorganic artillery support.
For ground transportation support,
the 31st MEU used its28-year-old
Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAV),
13-year-old High Mobility
Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs),
and 19-year-old five-ton trucks.
Todeploy the 31st MEU at 100 percent
readiness last November, other units
had torelinquish equipment,
particularly motor transport
vehicles, to replace MEUresources
undergoing maintenance. This placed
an increased ($350K)
maintenanceburden on the sourcing,
nondeploying units which continued
to handle routine, on-and off-island
commitments with fewer
resourses.While many of the most
urgent readiness concerns and
priorities are beyondour control
(e.g., inadequate strategic lift;
lack of on-island training areas
andranges; delayed modernization of
ground and aviation equipment), we
have soughtto minimize or postpone
the detrimental affects of those
deficiencies. Wherepossible,
commanders and staffs are
aggressively pursuing local
solutions tomitigate the continuing
readiness challenges. I’d like to
describe a few of theinnovative ways
we are trying to help ourselves.
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8First, there has been a great deal
of talk in American military circles
about aRevolution in Military
Affairs (RMA). These discussions
usually focus ontechnological
advances, but an RMA is about
thinking as much as it is
abouttechnology. And one area that
demands new thinking is our approach
to businessaffairs. In our Business
Reform Initiatives program, Marines
are systematically andrigorously
reviewing our business processes
with an eye toward adopting
moreefficient practices and creating
processes that work better and cost
less.Second, we recently
consolidated (for a one-year test)
the supply andmaintenance battalions
into “Materiel Readiness Battalion.”
The concept, whichrevolves around
commodity-based companies, promises
real potential in reducinginventory
and leveraging better industry
practices.Third, our movement to
“just in time” logistics represents
a potentially viableoption for
reducing the footprint of deploying
forces, though it has not been
testedduring a long term, major
deployment and will require a
transportation system withdepth and
redundancy. As strategic air and sea
lift assets are reduced, maintaining
along-term logistics flow to support
high intensity operations remains a
concern.Clearly, local initiatives
go only so far. While our operating
forces areadequately funded today to
perform assigned missions, a modest
increase to ourannual operations and
maintenance budget would enable us
to focus on training(instead of
equipment maintenance), thereby
becoming a more effective fighting
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9force. The supplemental funds
provided by Congress last year were
greatlyappreciated: III MEF’s share
($2.5M) was used to pay for
strategic lift for
trainingopportunities and to address
equipment maintenance needs. On the
aviation side,the flying hour
program is funded, but we are
heavily dependent on supplementsfrom
the Navy to keep the aircraft
maintained and flying; every year,
we riskshutting down in the fourth
quarter or deferring maintenance
until the new fiscalyear’s
appropriation arrives. We need $25M
more to fully fund the program
thisyear. Finally, our supporting
establishment (Bases) would also
benefit fromadditional funding for
key concerns: maintenance of real
property, year-round airconditioning
in our barracks and workspaces,
contract mess attendants,
informationtechnology, and our
Marine Corps Community Services
program.Now, I would like to address
what I consider a few of our
strengths. Despitechallenges,
training readiness and morale
throughout III MEF are good. I
attributethis to the fact that our
mission is operationally relevant
and therefore providesmembers a
sense of professional worth. The
quality of today’s Marines
coupledwith the augmentation
provided by the Marine Reserve
Forces, creates a TotalForce capable
of sustained combat in the event of
a major theater war. Our
reserveaugmentation is a “win-win”
scenario because it provides
reservists the chance totrain in a
theater in which they will most
likely deploy under current
mobilizationplans while
simultaneously relieving some of the
strain of the high operational
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10tempo on our active force. The
support provided by the government
of Japan,approximately $324 M per
year, allows our forces to remain
forward deployed withless expense to
the US taxpayers. Additionally, III
MEF includes several units
thatdeploy from CONUS and Hawaii to
Okinawa for six months. They arrive
fullystaffed, highly trained, and
ready, and we enhance their training
readiness through arobust exercise
schedule.Quality of life is good,
particularly for those with families
who appreciate theopportunity to
experience a different culture; to
raise children in a relatively
drugand crime free environment; and
to travel to exotic places. To
provide a great QOLand not
short-change those hardworking
Marines and Sailors, we need
continuedfocus on increasing
availability of military housing;
reducing the overcrowding inschools;
enhancing after-school academic
activities for family members;
andimproving recreational
opportunities for Marines, Sailors,
and their families.I assure you that
III MEF remains a key part of your
force in readiness today,thanks to
the dedicated efforts of many superb
men and women. To continueperforming
to the high standards that you
expect and America demands, we
mustretain the proverbial “best and
brightest” among this young force.
Our increasinglysophisticated
technology and the complex strategic
environment means our Marineswill be
making tactical and moral decisions
with potentially strategic
consequences.The “strategic
corporal” (a term coined by our
Commandant) is an absolute
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11necessity for the 21st century.
We’re building “strategic corporals”
in III MEF bydemonstrating that we
want risk takers -- and you don’t
get them just by saying it,but by
supporting them along the way. We
realize that when we ask them to
walkon water, they’re going to get
their feet wet! Your support is also
key in this effort;your recent
support of a pay increase and
retirement benefit reinstatement
goes along way in assuring members
and their families that the American
people recognizeand appreciate their
service and sacrifices.There are
serious issues of strategic import
for the United States and for
ourservice that must be confronted
in the next two years. In my view,
the need tostation American forces
overseas will not diminish; indeed,
it has become even moreimportant as
the world becomes increasingly
complex. If we try to avoid
theexpense and difficulty of keeping
troops abroad, the deterrence value
of the U.S.military will fall. No
matter how advanced the U.S.
military's technology orelectronics
become, they will never eliminate
the need for troops on the ground,
norwill they do much to reduce the
time it would take for warplanes or
ships to reachareas of conflict from
domestic bases. How we, as a nation,
as a department, as aservice,
resolve them -- with the support of
the Congress and the American people
--will influence global security for
decades to come.
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